INTRODUCTION

Expressions of good citizenship are a fascinating field for social behavior research. Good citizenship behavior represents the willingness of individuals to invest effort and energy in their social environment beyond any formal requirement and with no expectation of formal rewards. To date, good citizenship behavior has been analyzed in the general social context of obedience, loyalty, or voice tendencies (i.e., Hirschman, 1970; Marshall, 1950). Many studies have noted the social functionality and contribution of helping behaviors, volunteering, and altruism towards individuals, groups, or institutions. In recent decades this field has also received considerable attention in management studies and added new insight into our understanding of organizations and the workplace in modern societies. Hence, beyond its general social relevancy, this altruistic and helping behavior has proven to have interdisciplinary meanings. It has been the subject of a great deal of research in sociology, psychology, political science, management, and labor studies, as well as in other fields that have explored the interrelations among individuals, teams, groups, and the organizational machinery.

In the 1980s, Organ and his colleagues identified this contributing extra-role behavior as the “good soldier syndrome” in the workplace (Organ, 1988; Smith, Organ & Near, 1983). In many respects, this behavior was comparable to good citizenship behavior in various other social domains such as the political sphere or the communal sphere (Graham, 1991). Thus, they suggested calling the concept Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB), which, in ensuing years, became a topic of prime interest for scholars from various fields such as organizational behavior, management, business administration, public administration, and social psychology.

This paper, however, deals with a deviation from the conventional meaning of good citizenship behavior as suggested in the literature. It focuses on current
knowledge about OCB and on some observations that can reframe our understanding of this behavior. It argues that so far, most of the writings about OCB have clearly centered on its positive implications and contribution to organizational performance and to the social climate in the workplace. However, the paper develops a different discussion about citizenship behavior and about OCB, one that illustrates its less positive meaning. It suggests the existence of extra-role behavior that, in contrast with conventional OCB, is not based on the genuine, spontaneous “good will” of the individual. Instead, it emerges in response to external pressures by significant and powerful others in the workplace (i.e., managers or co-workers) who wish to increase the employees’ work load by involving them in duties that are beyond the scope of their job description (Porpara, 1989). The current article has its roots in the seminal works about good citizenship in general (i.e., Graham, 1991; Hirschman, 1970; Marshall, 1950) and about conventional OCB (i.e., Morrison, 1994; Organ, 1988; 1997; Podsakoff et al., 1990; 2000, Smith et al., 1983; Williams & Anderson, 1991, and others). However, it tries to move beyond the ideas advanced in these studies and accomplish several goals. First, I reconsider the contemporary understanding of citizenship behavior and OCB in light of the evidence about non-voluntary aspects of this behavior. I challenge the common view that all OCBs are voluntary and suggest that at least some of them may arise from coercive managerial strategies or coercive social pressure by powerful peers. For this purpose, I will discuss the boundaries of OCB as suggested by Morrison (1994) and the idea of abusive supervision (Tepper, 2000; Tepper et al., 2004; Zellars et al., 2002), as well as coercive persuasion (i.e., Lifton, 1961; Schein, 1961). I will then propose the concept of “compulsory OCB” (CCB) that represents a much darker and destructive side of OCB than the one we are accustomed to discussing as part of “conventional OCB.” The second goal of this paper will be to identify these destructive features of OCB from a theoretical standpoint and propose a relationship between them and other aspects of employees’ performance. Finally, I propose a redefinition of the meaning of OCB and provide some theoretical and practical guidelines for future research in this field and for a better understanding of this social behavior and its outcomes.

THE GOOD SOLDIER SYNDROME: ESSENTIAL BOUNDARIES AND THE MEANING OF “CONVENTIONAL OCB”

The field of OCB has emerged in recent decades as one of the most promising in organization performance studies. More than 270 studies have examined this phenomenon and emphasized its importance to management studies across sectors and cultures. Theoretically, these spontaneous behaviors by individuals have played a key role in increasing the effectiveness, efficiency, and positive climate in the workplace. Thus, managers and employees have been encouraged to increase their voluntary activities in organizations, as these were perceived to create a
healthier work environment, to lead to improved work outcomes, and to promote the goals of the organization as a whole (Organ, 1988; Organ & Ryan, 1995).

Hence, OCB is a relatively new concept in management literature, but in fact represents an old and enduring phenomenon of human altruistic behavior. This behavior may be treated from the social structure perspective. It is enduring and stable over time and has collective meaning beyond any specific social domain. The Marxist approach recognized it as contributing to a healthy society beyond the interests or motivation of unorganized individuals (Porpara, 1989). In addition, sociologists and social-psychologists have further noted its relevancy to the generic understanding of modern societies and of individuals’ behaviors towards each other. OCB integrates well into the four categories of the social structuralism approach described by Porpara (1989; p. 195): (1) patterns of aggregate behavior that are stable over time; (2) law-like regularities that govern the behavior of social facts; (3) systems of human relationships among social positions; (4) collective rules and resources that structure behavior.

Citizenship behavior, in organizations and beyond, may thus be considered a social structure that has its roots not only in the Marxist approach, but also in many other earlier works that specifically deal with spontaneous human action. For example, Katz and Kahn (1966) suggested that the effective functioning of an organization is highly dependent on innovative and spontaneous activities that are beyond prescribed role requirements. This behavior was termed “extra-role behavior” by Katz (1964) or “organizational citizenship behavior” (OCB) by Bateman and Organ (1983), who proposed this term to denote organizationally beneficial behaviors and gestures that can neither be enforced on the basis of formal role obligations nor elicited by a contractual guarantee of compensation. According to Organ’s definition, “OCB represents individual behavior that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and in the aggregate promotes the efficient and effective functioning of the organization” (Organ, 1988, p. 4). Thus, OCB consists of informal contributions that participants can choose to make or withhold, without regard to considerations of sanctions or formal incentives. OCB derives its practical importance from the premise that it represents contributions that are not part of formal role obligations. The presumption is that many of these contributions, aggregated over time and individuals, enhance organizational effectiveness (Organ & Konovsky, 1989).

As studies have shown, OCB is not a uni-dimensional construct. For example, Vardi and Weitz (2003) suggest the concept of organizational misbehavior (OMB) as the antithesis of good citizenship and OCB. Misbehavior is defined as a deviant social behavior that is harmful to the organization and may take five forms: intra-personal misbehavior (e.g., substance abuse), inter-personal misbehavior (e.g., sexual harassment), production misbehavior (e.g., absenteeism), property misbehavior (e.g., theft), and political misbehavior (e.g., favoritism). Whereas OCBs represent spontaneous social behavior that contributes to the organization, OMBs embody spontaneous social behavior that harms the organization in many ways. Thus, the
existence of OMBs may imply that citizenship behavior and OCB would be better studied on a continuum rather than as a dichotomous phenomenon.

Similarly, Smith, Organ, and Near (1983) developed a list of items inspired by interviews conducted with supervisory personnel in two organizations. The interviewers asked the supervisors to describe subordinates’ actions that they appreciated and regarded as helpful, but could not demand on the basis of supervisory authority or promise of remuneration. When the measure was pre-tested in several samples, two fairly clear-cut factors emerged. One factor suggested the quality of altruism. The items comprising this factor all had to do with helping a specific person, whether the supervisor, a co-worker, or a client. The other factor, at the time labeled “general compliance,” appeared to represent a more impersonal sort of OCB—conscientiousness in attendance, use of work time, and adherence to various rules, but a conscientiousness that far surpassed any enforceable minimum standards. Smith, Organ and Near (1983) argued that compliance emerged as a class of citizenship behavior factorially distinct from altruism. Whereas altruism appeared to represent the help accorded to specific persons as the situation prompted it, generalized compliance was a factor defined by a more impersonal sort of conscientiousness. It implied more of a “good soldier” or “good citizen” syndrome of doing things that were “right and proper,” but doing them for the sake of the system rather than for specific individuals. In the view of Smith, Organ and Near (1983), the two elements represent distinct classes of citizenship behavior, and therefore should be analysed separately.

Since the development of the concept, much research has been conducted to explore the possible determinants of OCB, and two related explanations have been posited for their effect. The first explanation about the emergence of OCB is based on the social exchange theory, which predicts that given certain conditions, people seek to requite those who benefit them. To the extent that a person’s satisfaction results from the efforts of organizational officials and such efforts are interpreted as volitional and non-manipulative in intent, one will seek to reciprocate those efforts. Citizenship behaviors of the sort described above are more likely to be under an individual’s control, and thus more likely to be a salient mode of reciprocation (Organ, 1990). A variable that seems to represent this contention the best is job satisfaction, one of the main determinants of OCB. Wayne and Green (1993), for example, found that leader–member exchange was related to altruism, but not to compliance behavior, supporting the social exchange explanation for the relationship between leader–member exchange and employee behavior.

The second explanation suggests that OCB stems from one’s perceptions of fairness or unfairness (Organ, 1988; 1990; Schnake, 1991). Organ (1990) postulated a general tendency for people to presume initially that they had a social exchange relationship with the organization. This presumption lasts until the weight of interpreted evidence indicates that such a relationship is not viable, because of unfairness. Confirmation of the lack of fairness in social exchange, which is accompanied by dissatisfaction, prompts a redefinition of the relationship
as one of economic exchange. Such a perception can be based on a social comparison, a promise or imagined promise, past experience, the going rate, or on one’s image of “the way the world should be.” Thus, people who perceive inequity are likely to withhold discretionary behaviors and to limit their contributions to the organization to those behaviors that are formally prescribed. Konovsky and Pugh (1994) found that procedural justice (the use of procedurally fair supervisory practices that affect higher-order issues like employees’ commitment to a system) and distributive justice (the fairness of transactional contracts and economic exchange) positively affect an employee’s trust in a supervisor, which in turn leads to higher levels of OCB. As a result, the majority of research regarding OCB has concentrated on variables that reflect an exchange of perceptions of fairness or equity in the workplace.

Nonetheless, a common denominator of all of the above studies is that they treated general citizenship behavior and especially OCB as a self-initiated, spontaneous, or voluntary behavior based on genuine good will, altruism, and internal motivation aimed at enhanced productivity of the social institution, and in the case of OCB, the workplace itself. OCB is also strictly different from OMB, as the latter is deliberately aimed at harming the organization. Thus, to date, most writings on OCB have emphasized its positive image, its constructive implications, its contribution to individuals and organizations at multiple levels, and its general reinforcement of performance in the workplace. To the best of my knowledge however, none of the studies has considered the possibility that OCB can also arise from other motives, some of them less voluntary or less self-initiated. Among these motivations are the abusive and exploitative behavior of immediate supervisors and the pressure by management or peers to become involved in activities in which the employee would otherwise not involve himself (i.e., Tepper, 2000). Thus, while the conventional approach has defined OCB on the assumption that all extra-role behaviors and OCBs are rooted in employees’ “good will,” rarely has anyone taken a different perspective, suggesting compulsory antecedents to extra-role or citizenship behaviors in and around the workplace. Obviously, the core essence of “good citizenship” may be viewed as completely inadequate in such cases of compulsory actions, given that OCB has generally been understood as a purely “voluntary” activity. However, as this paper suggests, there may be a unique segment of such extra-role behavior, one that is less voluntary but still expresses extra effort at work. This contradiction is explained and discussed in the next sections.

CHALLENGING “CONVENTIONAL OCB” WITH “COMPULSORY OCB” (CCB):
THEORY AND PROPOSITIONS

What happens when the free will of individuals to engage in so-called good citizenship behavior or OCBs is deliberately hijacked by managers or other powerful
social activists to increase work load? Where is the fine line between what people choose to do as a matter of “good will” and what they feel they must do because refusing to do so is just not an option? Putting it another way, can an informal, spontaneous act of “good will” become part of the formal job definition and therefore lose its essential meaning as a voluntary or extra-role activity in Katz’s (1964) sense of the term?

The theory of OCB has struggled with this paradox in several ways. First, there is considerable agreement among scholars that OCB basically reflects employees’ informal behavior. Managers should encourage this behavior even though they cannot compensate employees for performing OCBs or punish them for not performing such activities. According to Morrison (1994), OCB can be encouraged only when job tasks are clear and official role definitions effectively distinguish the formal requirements in the job from other informal, spontaneous gestures. Following this, employees and managers have a great deal of say over what should be defined as OCB and what exceeds the boundaries of such activities.

Second, Organ (1988) and other studies that followed (i.e., Lievens & Anseel, 2004; Mackenzie et al., 1991; 1993; Podsakoff et al., 1997; Podsakoff & MacKenzie, 1994) have identified various aspects of OCB such as Altruism (helping behaviors directed at specific individuals), Conscientiousness (helping behaviors directed at the organization as a whole), Sportsmanship (tolerating the inevitable inconveniences of work without complaining), Courtesy (informing others to prevent the occurrence of work related problems), and Civic virtue (participating in and being concerned about the life of the organization). All of these terms refer to the individuals’ free choice to become engaged in informal work activities. Altruism seems to be, by definition, a matter of free will. Forcing someone to act in an altruistic manner would seem to be a contradiction in terms. However, it is possible to put pressure on an individual to help and support others, even against his/her free will and even when the employee did not intend to become involved in such behavior in the first place. The same logic may work for conscientiousness, sportsmanship, courtesy, or civic virtue. They all lose their voluntary meaning when external pressure is applied.

Farh et al. (2004) suggest that recent discussions in the area of OCB question whether such behavior contributions must lay unambiguously outside the general sense of what “the job” is or whether they might be “rewarded” (George & Brief, 1992; Organ, 1997). However, their subsequent assertion is somehow questionable. Farh et al. (2004) suggest that there is some general agreement on these forms of contribution. According to their view, “they can be distinguished from task or technical performance, they have a more volitional and spontaneous character than core job contributions, and . . . they have positive effects on the social, psychological, organizational, and political contexts, than on the technical context” (p. 241). This last observation has recently been challenged by Zellars et al. (2002) and Tepper et al. (2004), who mentioned the option of abusive supervision in the workplace. The notion of abusive supervision suggests that extra-role behavior is
not always a matter of free choice by the individual but rather is imposed on him/her by abusive or exploitative management. Zellars et al. suggest that some supervisors engage in behavior that can be characterized as tyrannical (Ashforth, 1994), bullying (Hoel et al., 1999), undermining (Duffy et al., 2002) or abusive (Keashly et al., 1997). Abusive behavior refers to “subordinates’ perceptions of the extent to which their supervisors engage in the sustained display of hostile and nonverbal behaviors, excluding physical contact” (Tepper, 2000, p. 178). I would add that abusive behaviors may also include taking advantage of the employee in times and places where he/she is in no position to refuse a supervisor’s requests for assistance or for the performance of tasks that are clearly outside the employee’s formal job definition and the formal reward system of the organization. Zellars et al. (2002) examined the relationship between abusive supervision and OCB among 373 Air National Guard members and their military supervisors. They found a modest but consistent negative relationship that was moderated by role-definition and mediated by procedural justice. Another recent longitudinal study by Tepper et al. (2004) of 173 employees was conducted at two points in time and found that co-workers’ OCB was positively related to fellow employees’ job satisfaction and affective commitment when abusive supervision was low. However, when abusive supervision was high, co-workers’ OCB was negatively related to job satisfaction and was unrelated to organizational commitment.

Similarly, the idea of CCB and abusive behavior in many social institutions is a major concern of the coercive persuasion theory. Schein, Schneier, and Barker (1961), Lifton (1961), and Ofshe and Singer (1986) agree that coercive persuasion is a social influence tactic capable of producing substantial behavioral and attitudinal changes through the use of coercive methods, pressure, persuasion, power, and/or inter-personal and group-based influence manipulations. Thus, CCB may be viewed as another means by which those with authority and power take advantage of other, less powerful individuals who simply cannot resist or say “no.” By using coercive tactics, those in power extend the role definition of front-line employees and increase the pressure on them with the goal of lowering costs and increasing performance and outcomes. Hence, CCB is the negative reflection of the social structure of OCB (Porpara, 1989). However, and as will be suggested below, this compulsory/coercive behavior is much less effective than some may think and furthermore, may result in negative outcomes at the individual, team, or organizational level. Thus, its social functionality is highly disputed.

Along the same lines, Morrison (1994) raises the question of role-definition in OCB studies. Is there a clear enough conceptual boundary between OCB, or extra-role behavior, and in-role behavior that they can be viewed as distinct constructs? While Morrison’s (1994) study argues that this boundary varies across employees, my argument is that it may also vary across managers and peers who may apply various types of external pressure. In an attempt to increase competitiveness and the performance of the work unit, some managers and peers may try to narrow the gap between formal and informal work definitions. This argument
is supported by Graen (1976) and Morrison (1994) who noted that “roles in organizations are rarely fixed and that role perceptions evolve as employees and supervisors negotiate the scope of work activities” (p. 1544). In line with this approach, Salancik and Pfeffer (1978) suggest that jobs are socially constructed rather than objectively defined. They are cognitive constructions created when both employees and employers make sense of social and behavioral cues. Rousseau (1989) supports this notion in a study of the psychological contract that found a mismatch between employees’ understanding of their employment obligations and their employers’ understandings of these duties. Thus, Morrison (1994) summarizes by stating that the fine line between in-role and extra-role (OCB) behaviors is ill defined and subject to multiple interpretations. I argue that such multiple interpretations may also lead to various types of abusive or exploitative behaviors that impose extra-role activities on those who originally did not want to engage in them.

A final theoretical rationale for the importance of CCB is market-based. Increased market pressures and higher levels of competition have forced modern organizations to maximize their effectiveness and efficiency by all available means. As the theory of OCB has previously demonstrated, organizations with a strong emphasis on citizenship behavior are healthier and more successful than other organizations that lack such a climate (Podsakoff et al., 2000). Thus, it is an important goal of managers everywhere to make employees aware of the benefits of OCB and, if possible, encourage it. When such encouragement is conducted by legitimate means (i.e., improving the organizational climate, enhancing fairness and equity, or improving communication channels with employees), conventional OCB is indeed promoted. However, the pressure to strive for higher levels of OCB may also increase the likelihood that managers and managements adopt other strategies aimed at increasing extra-role behaviors by other means. Such abusive, exploitative activities may include exerting strong pressure on individuals to engage in unrecompensed extra-role work activities beyond their formal job definitions and creating a social atmosphere in which working extra hours beyond the formal work day with no formal compensation becomes the accepted norm. Employees may also be made to feel that unless they are willing to undertake these activities, their social position or even their formal standing in the organization, in terms of tenure, will be jeopardized. The fact that OCB has become a measure defined solely by employers is also problematic (Morrison, 1994). When most studies in the field define OCB from the perspective of the managers and supervisors (e.g., Fahr et al., 1990; Moorman, 1991; Organ & Konovsky, 1989; Podsakoff et al., 1990; 2000), an inherent bias is infused into our common understanding of OCB. In addition, managers have a monopoly on what is defined as OCB and what is not. In so doing, they sometimes extend the definition of formal duties into the informal area of good will and put unfair pressure on subordinates to undertake a heavier workload than they should strictly speaking be required to complete.
Propositions

Based on the rationale developed thus far, I decided to formulate several propositions that relate non-voluntary behaviors with organizational performance. The first proposition suggests that due to growing pressures on organizations to provide better services to their clients and to become more effective, they are more prone to engage in Compulsory Citizenship Behavior (CCB). I argue that employees frequently face strong social or managerial pressure to engage involuntarily in informal work activities. For all practical purposes, most employees must bow to such pressures, despite the fact that they will receive no formal reward or compensation for such activities. I further argue that had these pressures not been present, those employees would have chosen to withhold such activities. Thus, the word “voluntary” is actually not applicable here and the term “CCB” is a better description of such activities. Hence, I suggest a first proposition:

P1: **CCB is a prevalent phenomenon in organizations. A significant number of employees have experienced such behavior personally or in their immediate worksite.**

Based on proposition P1, my second proposition suggests that CCB can be clearly distinguished from conventional OCB. Based on Morrison (1994), I argue that what may be defined as OCB by employees is not always defined as such by managers. Thus, CCB is in fact anything but spontaneous behavior. Indeed, it represents a unique dimension of effort invested in the job (and in its members) resulting from abusive or exploitative supervision or strong social and managerial pressure. This pressure forces employees to engage in involuntary behaviors without receiving any formal rewards in return. My second proposition will thus be:

P2: **CCB is distinct from conventional OCB and from in-role performance, and represents a stand-alone facet of behavior in the workplace.**

The third and fourth hypotheses propose a linkage between CCB and various aspects of work outcomes and organizational performance. These hypotheses suggest that CCB is related to a series of work outcomes such as those tested in previous studies in relation to conventional OCB. Most, if not all of these relationships stand in sharp contrast to the relationships between conventional OCB and organizational performance as suggested in the literature. The rationale for these relationships is also comparable. When employees are forced to put more energy into informal job tasks, beyond those defined by their job definition and for which they receive no formal rewards, their reactions are expected to be negative. If conventional OCB is negatively related to job stress and burnout (Cromanzano et al., 2003), to organizational politics (Randall et al., 1999; Vigoda, 2000), to intentions to leave (Chen et al., 1998), and to negligent behavior (Turnley & Feldman, 2000), I suggest that CCB will be positively related to the same work outcomes. That is, I expect that higher levels of pressure by supervisors on employees to become engaged in extra-role behaviors will breed higher levels of job stress and burnout, enhanced perceptions of organizational politics, increased intentions to
leave the organization and a greater likelihood of engaging in negligent behavior. In addition, if conventional OCB is positively related to job satisfaction (Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004) and to in-role performance (Morrison, 1994; Turnley et al., 2003), I suggest that CCB is negatively related to these work outcomes, and perhaps also to in-role performance. These proposed relationships are also in line with several studies on the negative outcomes of abusive or exploitative supervision in the workplace. For example, Keashly et al. (1997) found that individuals who experienced more peer or supervisory abuse were less satisfied with their jobs. Richman et al. (1992) and Sheehan et al. (1990) studied medical students and residents to suggest that abusive supervision is associated with dissatisfaction and elevated levels of psychological distress. Finally, and in keeping with the above rationale and the literature, I also suggest that CCB is negatively related to innovation and entrepreneurship as well as to OCB.

Thus, P3 offers a series of positive relationships in which high levels of CCB may lead to (1) an increase in job stress and burnout, (2) higher levels of perceptions of organizational politics and unfairness, (3) stronger intentions of leaving the organization, and (4) negligent behaviors such as carelessness, apathy, or not meeting deadlines. In addition, H4 suggests that CCB may have a negative relationship with (1) innovative ventures and entrepreneurship orientations, (2) job satisfaction, (3) OCB, as represented by the common willingness of the workgroup to voluntarily help the organization or its members and, (4) formal in-role performance evaluations as provided objectively by managers.

**P3:** CCB is positively related to job stress, organizational politics, intentions to leave, negligent behavior, and burnout.

**P4:** CCB is negatively related to innovation, job satisfaction, OCB, and formal performance.

Finally, I suggest that CCB contributes to the explanation of various work outcomes over and above other variables such as participation in decision-making, job autonomy, or other personal variables. Participation in decision-making and job autonomy have long been identified as important predictors of performance in the workplace (i.e., Claessens et al., 2004; Lam et al., 2002) and have been studied in association with OCB and performance in many ways (i.e., Bell & Menguc, 2002; Van Yeperen et al., 1999). They portray the structural organizational environment and explain significant variance in job satisfaction (Evans & Fischer, 1992), job-stress and burnout (Grandey, Dickter & Sin, 2004), innovation and entrepreneurship in the workplace (De Dreu & West, 2001), organizational politics (Witt, Andrews & Kacmar, 2000), and intentions to leave the organization (Ito & Brotheridge, 2005). The general logic is that higher levels of participation in decision-making and more job autonomy are expected to improve work outcomes and general performance in the organization (Ito & Brotheridge, 2005). Nonetheless, I expect that the abusive and exploitative supervision typical of CCB puts pressure on employees to become engaged involuntarily in extra-role behavior. Furthermore, I believe that CCB will increase the explained variance of various work outcomes over and above the variance already explained by participation in
decision-making, job autonomy, and other personal variables. Hence, the final proposition suggests that:

**P5:** CCB makes a unique contribution to the explanation of work outcomes over and above the explanation of other structural variables (i.e., participation in decision-making and job autonomy) and personal variables (job status, education, tenure).

**DISCUSSION**

Can we put all extra-role behaviors in one basket of positive organizational citizenship, elsewhere defined as the “good soldier syndrome” (Organ, 1988)? What happens when employees’ good will is misused by exploitative or abusive managements to promote collective productivity at the expense of the individuals’ time and energy and against their free will? This paper raises some concerns about such practices and suggests that formal or informal coercive actions by managers and peers can result in extra-role behaviors by employees that are involuntary and ultimately destructive. I propose the concept of “Compulsory Citizenship Behavior” (CCB) to denote these imposed activities that may turn out to be harmful for individuals, groups, and the organization in general. I further distinguish among OCB, in-role performance, OMB, and CCB and suggest that CCB illustrates the controversial meaning of OCB based on a constructive approach to social activity (as opposed to OMB, which is based on the destructive orientations of the individual). The general phenomenon of “good citizenship” or OCB can thus be interpreted along a continuum with two ends. The first represents self-initiated activities (spontaneous/voluntary) that are aimed at helping the organization, other persons, or any other social institution. The second includes socially initiated activities (coercive/non-voluntary) that try to promote constructive ideas and interests by forcing or compelling others to invest time and effort beyond their duties. This second end is a negative deviation from the original notion of the good will of individuals and may also result in harmful collective and organizational outcomes.

This paper suggests that CCBs are directed at individuals in an attempt to increase organizational productivity while offering no formal rewards to those employees for their efforts. I posit that the outcomes stemming from this behavior will be negative: higher levels of job stress and burnout, stronger perceptions of organizational politics, more intentions to leave the organization, and an increased tendency to negligent behavior on the one hand, and lower levels of job satisfaction, innovation, OCB climate, and in-role performance on the other.

My arguments, that should be tested empirically, are in line with Morrison’s (1994) study, which suggests that an important determinant in employees’ behavior is whether they define a given activity as in-role or extra-role. For example, “if an employee defines helping co-workers as an in-role behavior, he or she will conceptualize the behavior very differently than an extra-role behavior and will perceive a different set of incentives surrounding the helping behavior” (p. 1544).
In the current paper, I follow this assertion and argue that sometimes a discrepancy exists among managers/peers and employees about the definition of certain work tasks as in-role or extra-role. The social environment in the workplace, as shaped by managers and peers, has a strong influence on the definition of a work duty as in-role or extra-role. For example, teachers who stay after school in order to help a student or use their free time to organize a social event, educational ceremony, or other activity for the students may consider this as extra-role behavior. Their principals, however, may see such activities as in-role duties. As a result, they provide no real rewards for them and do not compensate the teachers in return. According to my argument, when employees are coerced into performing what they see as extra-role behaviors, they may produce less than ideal work outcomes. Thus, I suggest that stretching the definition of extra-role behaviors into the twilight zone of in-role/non-voluntary activities can damage some of the essential goals of the organization and its performance.

The rationale behind CCB is also in line with the phenomenon of abusive management, as suggested by Tepper (2000) and later developed by Zellars et al. (2002) and Tepper et al. (2004). In fact, I disagree to some extent with the elementary definition of abusive behavior offered by Tepper (2000; p. 178) who argued that such activities refer to a display of hostile and non-verbal behaviors, excluding physical contact. I suggest that this definition should be expanded to also include exploitative behaviors and excessive requests made by managers of employees in such a manner that the latter cannot realistically refuse to comply. Abusive behavior in this regard should be defined as misusing the supervisor’s power and authority to force employees to perform activities involuntarily, activities they would not have otherwise undertaken and which take advantage of their good will and trample their freedom of choice. In our view, CCBs clearly fall into such a definition of abusive, exploitative supervision and ironically, turn out to be destructive for the organization as a whole. As suggested by Tepper (2000), targets of abusive behavior may remain in the organization and in the job because they feel powerless to take corrective actions, are economically dependent on the abusers, or fear the unknown associated with refusal or separation more than they fear the abuse.

The idea of CCB may also be relevant for the theory of coercive persuasion as suggested by Schein et al. (1961), Lifton (1961), and Ofshe and Singer (1986). This theory suggests that coercive persuasion is a social influence capable of producing substantial behavioral and attitudinal changes through the use of coercive tactics, persuasion, and/or interpersonal and group-based influence manipulations (Lifton, 1961; Schein et al., 1961). Such processes or programs have also been labeled “brainwashing” (Hunter, 1951), a term used more often in the media than in scientific literature. However identified, these processes and programs are distinguishable from other elaborate attempts to influence behavior and attitudes, to socialize, and to accomplish social control. Their distinguishing features are their totalistic qualities (Lifton, 1961), the types of influence procedures they employ, and the organization of these procedures into three distinctive sub-phases of the
overall process (Schein et al., 1961). The key factors that characterize coercive persuasion are: (1) The reliance on intense interpersonal and psychological attack to destabilize an individual’s sense of self to promote compliance; (2) The use of an organized peer group, or in the case of CCB, an intentionally coercive supervisor to exert pressure on the individual (3) The application of inter-personal pressure to promote conformity; (4) The manipulation of the totality of the person’s social environment to stabilize behavior once modified. Thus, CCB can clearly fall within the category of coercive persuasion that is used by powerful individuals in the organization to wring compliance with excessive job demands from employees.

Beyond the theoretical implications that this paper has for the future development of the concept of OCB and its effect on work outcomes, it may also have some interesting practical implications. First, I propose that CCB is quite prevalent in many organizations, be they public or private. For example, the pressure to work extra hours or to invest a huge amount of effort in one’s job are complaints frequently heard in the hi-tech industry, in healthcare systems, in the education system, and in military-based industries where competition is fierce and quality human resources are invaluable and scarce. Thus, a major practical implication of this paper is that managers should come to a clear agreement with employees about the boundaries of formal tasks and the point at which required in-role behavior ends and voluntary, spontaneous behavior begins. This can be achieved by clearer role definitions, improved communication channels, or by mutual negotiations among all of the members of the organization. These boundaries should be made clear to newcomers as well as to tenured employees and reconsidered when the managerial cadre is replaced or when major changes are incorporated in the organization. Another practical implication of this paper is that employees should be encouraged to speak up when they feel they are being overloaded with work. Various mechanisms should be developed to handle overload on the job, all based on the assumption that justice and fairness in the organization are crucial for the healthy involvement of employees in productive organizational activities. This suggestion is supported by the idea of interactional justice (as opposed to procedural justice and distributive justice) as formulated by Bies and Moag (1986) and more recently by Bies (2000). Interactional justice reflects the inter-personal dimension of fairness where “organizational representatives fail to treat employees with respect, honesty, propriety, and sensitivity to their personal needs” (Tepper, 2000; p. 179). It is thus highly relevant for CCBs, which put strong pressure on employees to give of themselves above and beyond the levels at which they might have originally chosen to perform.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Finally, the proposed theory of CCB may be analyzed not only through the social structure approach but also in light of political, communal and organizational
theories that focus on the extra-role altruistic behavior of individuals in a highly demanding social environment. These approaches that have provided us with the concept of “good citizenship” may lead to empirical studies that should: (1) propose a reliable and valid measure of CCB; (2) examine this measure in various kinds of social structures, organizations and on heterogeneous types of employees across cultures and nations; (3) test the propositions suggested here and others that may arise during the theoretical development of the concept; and (4) empirically distinguish conventional OCB from CCB.

One should note that the re-conceptualization of an established research genre such as OCB is not a frequent occurrence. The idea of CCB, as proposed here, has never been translated into a measurable scale in previous studies. Thus, this theoretical paper with its interdisciplinary orientations could not rely on previous empirical knowledge. In some ways, it is trying to break through old understandings and promote fresh thinking about the boundaries of OCB as an established social structure. The paper makes an effort to explore the darker side of OCB as one side of a continuum whose other side is the conventional OCB phenomenon. In between these extremes lies a wide range of formal behaviors that are more or less routine, habitual, and strictly task oriented. It is our expectation that more research, empirical and theoretical, will be conducted in an attempt to explore compulsory and coercive citizenship behaviors in various social domains. These studies will undoubtedly enrich our understanding of extra-role behavior, prosocial activities, and the conventional field of the good soldier syndrome in and around organizations.

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Acknowledgements. The author wishes to thank Taly Birman and Itai Beeri for their help in conducting this study.

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